statute is obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment. *Coppage* v. *Kansas*, 236 U. S. 1.

For a discussion of this case, in connection with the general problem of liberty of contract under the Constitution, see NOTES, p. 496.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PERSONAL RIGHTS — LIBERTY TO CONTRACT: STATUTE REQUIRING CORPORATIONS TO GIVE TRUE REASON FOR DISCHARGING EMPLOYEES. — A statute required every corporation to give a discharged employee a true statement of the reason for dismissal, within ten days after application therefor. *Held*, that the statute is obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment. *St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co.* v. *Griffin*, 171 S. W. 703 (Tex.).

For a discussion of the right to restrict liberty of contract, see NOTES, p. 496.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PERSONAL RIGHTS — LIBERTY TO CONTRACT: STATUTE REQUIRING EMPLOYERS TO GIVE EMPLOYEES ONE DAY OF REST IN SEVEN. — A statute required manufacturing and mercantile establishments to give their employees twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven days. NEW YORK LABOR LAW, Art. 6, § 8 *a*; CONSOLIDATED LAWS, c. 31 (LAWS OF 1909, c. 36), as amended LAWS OF 1913, c. 740; PENAL LAW, § 1275. *Held*, that the statute is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. *People* v. *C. Klinck Packing Co.*, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1925 (Ct. App.).

For a discussion of this case, in connection with the general problem of liberty of contract under the Constitution, see NOTES, p. 496.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — PERSONAL RIGHTS — LIBERTY TO CONTRACT: STATUTES RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS. — A statute required municipal corporations to employ on public works only United States citizens. NEW YORK LABOR LAW, Art. 2, § 14; LAWS OF 1909, c. 36. *Held*, that the statute deprives aliens of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. *People* v. *Crane*, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1408 (N. Y. App. Div.).

An Arizona statute forbade any employer to hire more than a certain percentage of aliens. *Held*, that the statute is unconstitutional. *Raich* v. *Attorney-General* (not yet reported. Decided by the U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Arizona, early in January, 1915).

For a discussion of these cases, in connection with the general problem of liberty of contract under the Constitution, see NOTES, p. 496.

CORPORATIONS — CHARTERS — REFORMATION OF CHARTER FOR MISTAKE OF INCORPORATORS. — Articles of incorporation, filed in compliance with a general law, by mistake of the incorporators failed to include a qualification on the clause restricting the right to dispose of stock. *Held*, that equity has no jurisdiction to reform the articles. *Casper* v. *Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co.*, 149 N. W. 754 (Wis.).

At common law the creation of corporations is the prerogative of the sovereign, exercised, under the constitutional theory of division of powers, by the legislature. See *Spotswood* v. *Morris*, 12 Ida., 360, 383, 85 Pac. 1094, 1101; *People* v. *Coleman*, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 624, 13 N. Y. Supp. 833. See *McKim* v. *Odom*, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 407, 417. The special grant of a corporate charter is therefore regarded as a legislative act. *Lee* v. *Bude & T. J. Ry. Co.*, L. R. 6 C. P. 576. The same theory has prevailed where the incorporation is under a general law. See *Lord* v. *Equitable Life Assur. Society*, 194 N. Y. 212, 238, 87 N. E. 443, 452. In substance, however, incorporation under a general law is consensual in nature. By passing such a law the sovereign seems to have entrusted his prerogative, to that extent, to the people, leaving them free to incorporate at their own volition. The act of filing the articles of incorporation in substance places on record the contract between the incorporators, and in

itself involves no peculiar legislative action. Accordingly there seems no compelling reason why the articles should not lie within equity's jurisdiction to reform. See *Cleghorn* v. *Zumwalt*, 83 Cal. 155. The exercise of a jurisdiction to reform for mistake in any given case would depend, of course, upon the degree to which strangers, who had relied upon the articles as filed, might be prejudiced. Nor would such control of corporate charters by equity be wholly exceptional, for it has long exercised similar supervision in disregarding the corporate fiction when necessary to avoid unconscionable use of the franchise. See *United States* v. *Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.*, 142 Fed. 247, 254.

CRIMINAL LAW — DEFENSES — PARTICIPATION TO DETECT CRIME. — The defendant had received money from X to make an illegal purchase of whisky from Y, and under promise of immunity given by a deputy sheriff, in order to acquire evidence against Y, made the purchase, and delivered the whisky to X. The defendant was then indicted under a statute making it a crime to act as agent of the buyer in an unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. *Held*, that a conviction is proper. *Brantley* v. *State*, 65 So. 512 (Miss.).

A detective who coöperates with a criminal for the purpose of getting evidence against him cannot be guilty of an offense for which an *animus furandi* is required. *Price* v. *People*, 109 Ill. 109. See *Commonwealth* v. *Hollister*, 157 Pa. 13, 27 Atl. 386. Even where this element is not essential, although *mens rea* is clear from the detective's intentional participation in the criminal act, he will be protected. See *Carroll* v. *Commonwealth*, 84 Pa. St. 107; *Wright* v. *State*, 7 Tex. Cr. App. 574. This immunity has been carried to the dangerous extent of protecting the detective where, had he not been acting in that capacity, he would have been independently guilty of the offense he was endeavoring to detect. *Regina* v. *Bannen*, 2 Moody C. C. 309; *State* v. *Torphy*, 78 Mo. App. 206. But see *Dever* v. *State*, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 396, 30 S. W. 1071. The principal case is clearly right in not extending the immunity to the commission of a crime quite distinct from that committed by the criminal. The proper test, however, would seem to be not whether the crime committed was a separate offense, but rather, whether the detective's crime be one for which he could be held independently, though the criminal had never gone forward and completed the offense. Any other principle would give immunity to the commission of murder as a means of detecting a murderer.

EASEMENTS — NATURE AND CLASSES OF EASEMENTS — RIGHT TO AN UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW OF THE PREMISES FROM THE HIGHWAY. — A.'s building projected into the highway eighteen inches beyond B.'s, so that a portion of the side wall was exposed to view from the street. A. was in the habit of using this wall for advertising purposes. B. set up signboards at right angles to the front of his building, extending from a point about eight inches from the ground upward for twenty-two feet, at about nine inches from the side wall of A.'s building, entirely obscuring the view of the wall from the street. In a suit by B. for damages from A.'s pasting bills over these boards, A. counterclaims, asking an injunction to restrain B. from obstructing the view of his wall. *Held*, that the injunction will be granted. *Cobb* v. *Saxby*, [1914] 3 K. B. 822.

For a discussion of the question whether this case necessitates a recognition of a "right of publicity," see NOTES, p. 499.

EVIDENCE — DOCUMENTS — AUTHENTICATION OF LETTERS NOT IN SENDER'S HANDWRITING. — In an action on an account, the plaintiff offered in evidence letters alleged to have been sent by the defendant, an illiterate. The plaintiff could not authenticate the letters by direct proof, but showed that they related to the account, and were consistent with facts as otherwise proved. Some of the letters purported to contain checks, and corresponding checks were pro-